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1. SUMMARY: Petr contends: (1) An FIUC-insured, non-
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equity certificate of deposit, bearing a ~f~~~~ ~a~e E f interest 
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and issued by a commercial bank, is not a "security" under the 
.,t..o ~,.RL~ ;..::( L / 
1933 Act or the 1934 Act; and (2)~wr'tte ~i-d~ 
inter alia, that resps would rece ve 50% of the profits of a 
~~~
business, did not create a "secur1ty" under the 1933 Act or the 
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2. FACTS & DECISION BELOW: In 1976, Marine Bank made 
several loans to Columbus Packing Company, an unincorporated 
business owned by Mr. and Mrs. Piccirillo. Columbus Packing 
operated a wholesale slaughterhouse and a retail meat market. In 
1978, concerned that the Piccirillos would be unable to repay 
these loans, Marine Bank negotiated a new loan agreement with 
Columbus Packing. The bank~ Columbus Packing $65,000, 
secured by security interests ~equipment, inventory, and 
accounts receivable, liens on motor vehicles, and liens on two 
pieces of real estate. Mr. and Mrs. Weaver, who were farmers 
engaged in auctioning livestock, guaranteed payment of the 
Piccirillos' debt up to $50,000. They pledged to the bank a 
------~~~-------------~ 
$50,000 certificate of deposit that Marine Bank had issued to 
them. This~erti~ate of~eposi ~ earned a fixed rate of 
~
interest, payable in six years. Prior to cl~sing on the loan, 
the guaranty agreement, and the pledge, the Piccirillos and the 
. 
Weavers entered into a written agreement which provided that the 
Weavers would receive 50% of the adjusted net profits of Columbus 
Packing so long as the weavers remained co-obligors, that the 
Weavers would receive $100 per month until the loan was repaid, 
that the Weavers could veto any future loans to Columbus Packing, 
and that the Weavers could use the barn and pasture on the 
packinghouse premises at the discretion of the Piccirillos. 
The Piccirillos used the proceeds of the $65,000 loan to 
repay past loan and overdraft obligations, to pay federal taxes, 
and to repay creditors. This left only $3800 for working 
capital. Four months later, Columbus Packing filed a bankruptcy 
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petition. Marine Bank sought to resort to the Weavers' pledged 
certificate of deposit, since the bank's security and Columbus 
Packing's property were inadequate to repay the loan. 
The Weavers filed suit in USDC, claiming that Marine had 
violated §lO(b) of the 1934 Act, §17(a) of the 1933 Act, and the 
-------------~-------------~ ""' Pennsylvania Securities Act. The DC granted summary judgment for 
Marine Bank, holding as a matter of law that the certificate of 
deposit was not a security and that the written agreement between 
the Weavers and the Piccirillos did not create a security.l A 
divided CA reversed; holding: 
---") 
"From the pleadings, affidavits, and depositions 
on file, .•• a fact-finder could find that .. 
• employees of the bank approached the Weavers 
and urged them to make an investment in Columbus 
Packing for the purpose of providing working 
capital •••. Further, it could be foun~ that 
the Weavers .•• w~re Rersuaded td' pledge their 
Certif' ate ~f e osit in exc ange or a 000 
loan to Colum us Pa~ ing on the represen a 1on 
tnat substantially all of the loans would be 
available EO that business for working capital, 
and on the representation that the existing 
collateral adequately protected both their 
interest and the bank's. • • • 
"A fact-finder certainly could on the record 
1 before us find that the ~k's la~ula~ive and 
deceptive conduct, if it took p ace, was in 
con~ith the execution and delivery of an 
agreement between the Piccirillos and the Weavers 
by which, in consideration of their pledge of a 
$50,000 Certificate of Deposit to enable Columbus 
Packing to obtain a working capital loan, they 
were given a 50% interest in the anticipated 
profits of the Piccirillo's slaughterhouse." 
I lr have attached the definition of Securities Exchange Act of 1933 and the 
of 1934. 
"security" under the 
Securities Exchange Act 
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(1) The agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos 
could be found by a trier-of-fact2 to be a certificate of 
interest or participation in a profit-sharing agreement, or an 
investment contract, or both. (a) The classic example of a 
certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing 
arrangement cited by Professor Loss is a contract whereby the 
buyer furnishes funds and the seller the skill for speculating in 
the stock or commodities market under an arrangement to split 
profits. See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 489. There is no 
reason why a sale of an interest in the future profits of a 
slaughterhouse should be treated differently. (b) In SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946), the Court stated that the 
test for distinguishing an investment contract from a mere 
commercial or a consumer transaction is "whether the scheme 
involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with 
profits to come solely from the efforts of others." The DC erred 
in holding as a matter of law that this agreement was not an 
investment contract.3 
(2) The DC also erred in holding as a matter of law that 
the certificate of deposit was not a security. In Tcherepnin v. 
2 The court explained that it spoke in terms of what a 
jury could find because it was reviewing a grant of summary 
j\!dgment. "We do not imply that absent some issue off'at t raised 
by~ defendant the issue should not be decided as a matter of 
law." A-7, note 3. 
3The CA acknowledged that a fact-finder could decide in 
favor of Marine Bank on this issue if it determined that use of 
the barn and pasture was the primary purpose of the transaction . 
. . 
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Knight, 389 u.s. 332 (1967), the Court held that withdrawable 
capital shares in a savings and loan association were 
securities. Although Tcherepnin is not controlling, it is 
difficult to distinguish long-term deposit transactions with 
institutions such as the savings and loan in Tcherepnin from 
similar deposit transactions with banks. Furthermore, the SEC 
has taken the position that certificates of deposit issued by 
banks are securities.4 
Judge Weis dissented, stating: (1) The transaction between 
the Weavers and the Piccirillos did not create a security, since 
the arrangement did not involve multiple investors, use of a 
public market, or a public offering. This type of transaction 
should be regulated under state law. (2) The certificate of 
deposit was not a security. Tcherepnin is not on point. The 
shares involved in that case entitled the holders to a share of 
the profits and they were transferrable. A certificate of 
deposit is more like a savings account than it is like a bank's 
capital stock. See Bellah v. First National Bank of Hereford, 
495 F.2d 1109 (CAS 1974) (CA rejected various arguments 
plaintiffs made to support their contention that a certificate of 
deposit is a security, yet it permitted plaintiffs to pursue the 
4 The CA also held that the pledge of the certificate of 
deposit constituted a "sale" of a security. 
TheCA concluded the opinion by remarking that the DC's 
opinion displayed a "general tone of nostalgia for the days when 
victims of fraud were relegated to the common-law remedy of 
deceit." The CA asserted that the federal courts "ought to 
interpret the 1934 Act with a presumption of coverage of any 
transaction which Congress did not expressly exclude." 
-6-
issue on remand); Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. 
Fingland, 615 F.2d 465 (CA7 1980) (CA held that the allegations 
of the complaint did not establish that the certificate of 
deposit involved in that case was a security). But see SEC v. 
First American Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673 (CAS 1973) 
(certificates of investment and savings accounts characterized as 
"securities"). The ALI's proposed Federal Securities Code 
specifically excludes from the definition of "security" a "bank 
certificate of deposit that ranks on a parity with an interest in 
a deposit account with the bank." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petr contends: (1) An FDIC-insured non-
equity certificate of deposit, bearing a fixed rate of interest 
'-· -- ---- ---
and issued by a commercial ban.k.,- is not a "security," as defined 
~
in the 1933 Act or the 19·34 Act. The CA's decision conflicts 
with Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. v. Fingland, 
supra, and Bellah v. First National Bank of Hereford, supra. 
~~ Although the SEC has taken the position that certificates of 
~~~deposit issued by banks are securities, there is nothing in the 
~ language or the legislative history of the 1933 or 1934 Acts to 
support this position. The Glass-Steagall Act generally 
prohibits banks from underwriting, buying, or selling equity 
securities. Under the CA3's decision, many commercial banks 
would be violating the Glass-Steagall Act by accepting 
certificates of deposit. TheCA erred in relying on Tcherepnin, 
supra, for the shares at issue in that case were withdrawable 
capital shares that carried a right to vote and were not entitled 
to a fixed rate of return. The certificate of deposit involved 
-7-
in this case carried no voting rights, paid a fixed rate of 
interest, ana oio not represent shares in the bank. 
(2) The written agreement between the Piccirillos ana the 
weavers oio not constitute a "security" under the 1933 or the 
1934 Act. This was a private arrangement between two married 
individuals. Mr. weaver oio not pool his investment with anyone, 
ana there was no public offering or advertising. The CA thus 
misapplied the criteria for a "security" under the 1933 Act, as 
set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 u.s. 293, 301 (1946), ana 
as extended to the 1934 Act in Tcherepnin, supra. Furthermore, 
Marine Bank could not have acted with scienter with respect to 
this agreement, since it hao no knowlege of the agreement. 
Resps reply: (1) Resps oo not argue that the original 
purchase of the certificate of deposit from Marine Bank 
constituted a purchase of a security under the 1933 or 1934 Act. 
Rather, they argue that the exchange of the certificate of 
deposit, by way of the pledge, for investment purposes 
constituted a sale of a security under the 1933 ana 1934 Acts.S 
Since this was an investment transaction rather than a 
traditional commercial banking transaction, the CA's holding will 
have little effect on the banking industry. 
(2) Although petr contends that the written agreement was 
5 Resps also assert that the Court's recent decision in 
Rubin v. United States disposes of the first question presenteo--
"namely that the pledge of the Certificate of Deposit for the 
loan constitutes the purchase and sale of a security under the 
Securities Acts." However, petr ooes~rgue in the cert petn that 




not an investment contract, petr does not challenge the CA's 
alternative holding that the agreement could be considered a 
certificate of interest or participation in a profit-sharing 
agreement. In this case, there was a pooling of Weaver's capital 
with Piccirillo's equipment and labor, and Weaver's return on his 
investment was contingent upon this combination of capital and 
labor producing profits. A "security" may be involved even if 
there is no public offering or advertising. See, ~' 
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 
U.S. 6 (1971); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128 (1972). 
(3) The CA did not suggest that petr could be held liable 
without proof of scienter. Weaver is not claiming that the bank 
acted negligently, but rather that it intentionally defrauded him 
out of his $50,000 certificate of deposit. 
4. DISCUSSION: I recommend a CFR SG to explore the issue 
of whether a certificate of deposit may be considered a 
"security." I agree with petr that Tcherepnin is easily 
distinguishable, since the securities involved in Tcherepnin were 
capital shares that were transferrable, carried the right to 
vote, and entitled the holder to a share of the savings and loan 
association's profits. The Court emphasized that the holders of 
these shares were not entitled to a fixed rate of return. 389 
U.S., at 337. I do not understand resps' argument that even if 
this certificate of deposit was not a "security" when purchased, 
it was a security when it was pledged. 
I am less troubled by the CA's holding that the written 
-9-
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos could be viewed 
as creating a "security." The CA concluded that a trier of fact 
could regard this as a profit-sharing arrangement, since the 
Piccirillos provided the labor, the Weavers essentially provided 
working capital, and in return the Weavers acquired an interest 
in the future profits of the business. 





Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S. C. § 77b( I): 
(I) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury 
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in an rofit-sharing agreement, 
collateral-trust ~preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, or, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
"'security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, 
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, 
or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the 
foregoing. 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(IO): 
(I 0) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury 
stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation 
in any profit-sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other 
mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, pre-
organization certificate or subscription, transferable share, 
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of 
deposit, for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly 
known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participa-
tion in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing; 
but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, 
or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of 
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of 
grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise 
limited. 
'-'VUTJ, r u~~u utt Assigned . ... · · · · · · · · · · · · · . , 1., .. . 
Announce~· .. . . ······· · ···., 19 .. . 
.... .. ..... ... .. , 19 
No. 80 1562 Argued . .. . . . . . 
Submitted · · · · · · · · · · ·, 19 . .. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell January 8, 1982 
From: Mary 
No. 80-1562, Marine Bank v. Samuel and Alice Weaver ( CJI ~ - w......._ 
 
Questions Presented 
The major question is whether a certificate of derosit is a - --
security subject to the anti-fraud provision of the Securities and 
Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934 ~ it is pledged to the issueE as -collateral for a guarantee of a loan. The other question is whether 
<. 
a unique agreement between the guarantors and the borrowers is a 
security under the Act, and, if so, whether, on the facts of this 
case, the Bank is liable for fraud in the sale of that security. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Facts and Proceedings Below 
Because of the procedural posture of the case (the DC 
2. 
granted summary judgment against the pltfs), I will present the 
facts (briefly) according to pltfs' (resps) view of t~f 
Between 1976 and 1978, petr Marine Bank had loaned $33,000 
in demand loans to Columbus Packing Co. (Columbus) (a slaughterhouse 
and retail meat store owned and operated by Raymond and Barbara 
Piccirillo) Because of the Bank's failure to perfect its security 
interest in Columbus' assets, it did not have a secured position as 
of Mar. 17, 1878. All loans were overdue on Jan. 16, 1978, and 
Columbus was unable to make any interest or principal payments on 
that date or thereafter. In addition, Columbus's checking account 
was overdrawn by $7,758.77 (this account had been overdrawn almost 
constantly since Apr., 1977, with an average overdraft of $9,000). 
In order to reduce its exposure, the Bank first tried to .&-.._._ 
get the Small Business Administration to loan Columbus money. When 
this fell through, the Bank approached the weavers (who had recently 
~ ..... 
purchased a 5-year $50,000 CD from the Bank) and suggested that they 
guarantee a loan of $65,000 to the Piccirillos to improve their 
working capital-position. In 1978, Sam and Alice Weaver were 
retired farmers, with eighth grade educations, 78 and 71 years old 
'::: ~ 
respectively. The Bank's representative stated that with their 
.~· .. 
3. 
the Bank would offer a $65,000· loan to Columbus, 
substantially all of which would go to the business as working 
The weavers were never told that Columbus was indepted to 
the Bank or that Columbus had any serious financial problems. The 
.... 
Bank did tell the Weavers that there was little risk in their 
guarantee, that the bank had perfected security interests in 
Columbus' equipment and working capital and that the value of this 
collateral was enough to protect the Bank and the Weavers. 
In reliance on these representations, the Weavers entered 
~~ into an agreement with the Picirrillos, to which the Bank was not a 
~ party. In return for the guarantee, the Weavers were given the 
w~following rights: (l) use of the barn and pasture on the 
slaughterhouse premises; (2) 50% of the "adjusted net profits" of 
Columbus Packing so long as the Weavers remained co-obligors; (3) 
$100 a month until the loan was repaid; and (4) veto of any future 
loans to Columbus. According to the weaver's own tesimony, they 
never told the Bank about agreement, which was prepared by the 
Picirillos' lawyer and signed at ~Weavers' house shortly before 
March 17, 1978. 
On March 17, 1978, the weavers pledged their CD to the Bank 
and the Bank loaned Columbus $65,000. Of that amount, $42,515.37 
went to cover the loans and overdrafts held by the Bank itself, most 
of the rest went directly from the Bank to trade creditors and to 
the IRS. Only $3,833.06 was available to Columbus for working wuw-' 4 
capital. The Bank never had any reasonable expectation that the 
loan would be repaid by Columbus. On May 9, Columbus closed its 
business due to lack of capital; it filed r bankruptcy in July. 
4. 
The Bank refuses to return the CD to th~ Weavers and concedes that 
foreclosure is inevitable. 
On May 4, 1979, the weavers filed a complaint in , DC. They -
claimed that the Bank had violated Pa. securities law, the common 
law of fraud, and federal rule lOb-5 (enforcing SEA §lOb) in 
connection with the sale or purchase of two securities, the CD and 
the Weaver-Picarrillo agreement (the W-P agreement). 
On Jan. 11, 1980, the DC (Willson) dismissed the action. 
It held that neither the pledged CD nor the W-P agreement was a 
security for purposes of the federal security laws. The pendant 
state claims were dismissed because the DC could "find no subject 
matter juisdiction [over the federal claims] under the statute 
involved." 
The CA3 (Gibbons & Sloviter) (Weis dissenting) reversed, 
holding that both the CD and the W-P agreement were securities. The _....... ..___ -=-
CA also reversed the dismissal of the state-law claims, so that, on 
remand, the DC could decide whether they should be tried with the 
federal claims. 
The propriety of the remand of the pendant claims is not 
included in the questions on which cert was granted. The two 
estions presented are: was the pledge of the CD the pledge of a 
for purposes of §lO(b) liability? was the W-P agreement a 
security and, if so, can the Bank be held liable for fraud in its 
sale to the Weavers? 
B. The Regulatory Framework 
In March of 1933, President Roosevelt sent to Congress the 
bill that was to become the Securities Act of 1933. At that time, 
he expressed the view that bank regulation should be embodied in 
separate legislation. See 77 Cong. Rec. 937 (1933). Shortly 
thereafter, a Senate resolution authorized the Senate Committee on 
5. 
Banking and Currency to continue its investigations of the practices 
of companies engaged in "the business of banking" and companies 
engaged in the securities business. S. Res. 56, 73rd Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1933). As a result of these and earlier investigations, 
Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. §77a et seq., 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. 78a et seq., and the 
Banking Act of 1933 (commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act) . 1 
As the Court pointed out in ~rnst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 
425 u.s. 185 (1976) (Powell, J.), the securities acts were intended 
to protect investors against fraud and manipulation of stock prices 
by (1) regulating transactions in the securities exchanges and in 
the over-the-counter markets~ (2) imposing specified civil 
liabilities to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair 
dealing~ and (3) imposing reporting requirements applicable to 
companies whose stock is listed on the national securities 
exchanges. Id., at 195 (citing H. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 1st 
Sess., 1-5 (1933) and S. Rep. No. 792, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 
(1934). In contrast, the Glass-Steagall Act focused on the 
interests of depositors and provided a comprehensive scheme of 
regulation over many aspects of the operation and management of 
1 48 Stat. 162, codified in various sections of title 12 of 
u.s.c. 
!'" . . 
-
' . banking institutions. t1f 
Initially, all the federal regulators apparently assumed 
1\ 
that the securities acts did not apply to bank deposits, including 
CDs. By 1966, however, the SEC, the FDIC, the Comptroller of the -
6. 
Currency, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and the Federal Reserve 
,, "" System, all seem to have agreed that even savings deposits were -
securities covered by the acts. 
'- ~-.....--.. 
See FDIC, Statement of Policy on 
Advertising for Funds by Insured State Nonmember Banks, 31 Fed. Reg. 
16,581 (1966) • 2 But by 1974, the FDIC and the SEC wre filing -opposing briefs in cases involving CDs issued by state-chartered 
federally insured (and regulated) banks, with the FDIC arguing that 
the securities acts did not apply. SG brief at 2, n.l. And by 
1976, the Comptroller was agreeing with the FDIC. Id. These 
disagreements were resolved in preparing the brief of the government 
to this Court in this case. The new unanimous position of the 
• t ,, -.. 
~~ executive is that deposits, including CDs, of federally-insured (and 
7 
/ 
therefore federally-regulated) banking institutions are not 
securities at the time of issue. .. 
~ 
Despite the varying views of the executive, the courts seem 
· to have generally assumed that bank savings accounts are equivalent 
to currency and not securities for purposes of the securities acts. 
See Burrus, Cootes & MacKethan, 567 F. 2d 1262, 1264 (CA4 1976). 
2This interpretation seems to have initiated with the SEC, 
possibly in response to increased bank advertising for deposits 
during the sixties. Those advertisements were regarded as 
misleading; items such as interest rates and whether or not rates 





The question before the Court is whether a bank CD is a deposi 
account or a security. Most of the lower courts considering the 
question have held that certificates of deposit issued by federally 
regulated banks are not securities. See cases collected in SG's 
brief n.32, at 20. 
II. DISCUSSION 
A. Is a CD a Security? 
1. The language of the statute and its legislative 
history. 
,,,, a....t-
Section 3(a) (10) of the SEA, 15 u.s.c. §78c(a), provides 
that: 
"When used in this chapter, unless the context 
otherwise requires ••. 
(1)) the term 'security' means any note, stock, 
treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest 
or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in any 
oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any 
collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate 
or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, 
voting-trust certificate, certificate -o f depos i t, f or a 
security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as 
a 'security '; or any' certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, 
receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include 
currency or any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's 
acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of 
not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or 
any renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise 
limited." 
Congress included every item that, in the view of the legislators, ___. 
might be thought to be a security and added a catchall phrase to 
cover exotic or unusual transactions or anything that might be 
invented later with the same characteristics or possibilities for 
abuse that known securities had. See H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73rd Cong., 
1st Sess. 11 (1933). At that time, certificates of deposit were a 
I '1: ~· 
8. 
known and common part of the banking business. A federal statute 
had explicitly authorized their issuance by banks since 1913. 
Federal Reserve Act §19, 38 Stat. 270. Congress' failure to include 
this known commodity by its common name suggests that Congress did ~ 
not consider CDs securities. 
-------- ---
Congress did include "certificates of deposit, for a 
security." Thus, the statute included receipts of the CD-type, but 
only for items already securities. 3 A bank deposit is not a receipt 
for a security--it is a receipt for an unpaid balance of money or 
its equivalent, 12 u.s.c. §1813, and money is not a security. A CD 
is merely one form of savings (not investment) device available for {~ 
bank depositors (not investors). 
The legislative history shows affirmatively that Congress 
bank within the term "securities." At the House Hearings, in 
response to a question from Representative Mapes relating to the 
coverage of the proposed §3(a), quoted above, defining "security." 
Huston Thompson, one of the draftsmen of the bill, explained that 
while the bill would encompass "any kind of a security of a national 
bank," he did not suppose a national bank would be putting out 
anything in addition to its capital stock." Federal Securities Act: 
Hearings on H.R. 4314 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 73rd Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (1933). 
3This type of receipt was commonly used in corporate 
reorganizations. See 1 Loss, Securities Regulation 460, 462 (2d ed. 
1961). 
9. 
There is also evidence that, iri considering the bill that 
became the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA), Congress viewed 
the economic interests of depositors as distinct from those of 
investors, and it was the interest of investors that received 
special protection under the securities laws. During the Senate 
hearings, Senator Adams, a member of the Banking and Currency Comm., 
and Algbert Wiggin, a witness and former banker, emphasized that 
safety of principal was far less a problem for depositors than 
investors. Stock Exchange Practicers: Hearings on S. Res. 84 and S. 
Res. 56 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong., 
2d Sess. 2426-2427 (1934) • 
Moreover, the Glass-Steagall Act, enacted on June 16, 1933, 
provided that it was illegal for any entity engaged in the business 
of selling, issuing, underwriting, or distributing "securities, to 
engage at the same time in the business of receiving deposits 
subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a passbook, 
certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request 
of the debtor." Act §21 (a) (1), current version at 12 u.s.c. 
§378(a). This provision was enacted a mere 19 days after the 
passage of the Securities Act of 1933, which has a definition of 
security virtually identical to the the definition in the 1934 SEA 
whose meaning is at issue in the case at bar. This suggests that 
Congress both knew how to say CD when it meant CD and that CDs are 
not securities--if they were, it would be illegal for banks to 
engage in the business of issuing them. 
Given the wording of the definition of "security" and the 
legislative history of the acts, it seems fairly likely that a CDs 
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were not included when Congress used th~ term "security." This 
result receives further support from the decsions of this Court 
considering whether various interests are securities and the 
decisions of the CAs on the status of both CDs and on notes. 
2. S. Ct. caselaw. In the past, the Court has interpreted 
the word "security" to refer to an investment in a for-profit 
enterprise run by another. Three S. Ct. cases are of most relevance 
to the case at bar. In Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 332 (1967) 
(Brennan, J.), the Court held that a withdrawable capital share in a 
state-chartered savings and loan (S & L) was a security. Under Ill. 
law, the holders of the shares were members of the S & L ass'n and 
entitled to vote on ass'n matters, much like shareholders in regular 
corporations. Id., at 336. The holders of these shares were not 
entitled to a fixed rate of return, but instead were entitled to 
whatever dividends might be declared from time to time by the Board 
of Directors. Id., at 337. The S & L was uninusred, so 
shareholders stood to lose any money they had in the S & L in the 
event of insolvency. And the legislative history, discussed above, 
suggested that the shares were securities because it indicates that 
Thompson, one of the drafters, expected national banks to issue 
securities in the form of capital stock--items quite similar to the 
S & L's (withdrawable) capital shares. 
~ -1; l, •"()fS ( Although, to an S & L "depositor," withdrawable capital 
1 • .J~ shares may be functionally equivalent to a bank deposit or CD, ' rvt1V'-
Tcherepnin does not control the case at bar. The weavers did not 
purchase anything similar to a share of stock. They had no right to 
7 
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vote. They contracted for a fixed rate 'of return over a fixed 
period of time. Marine Bank is insured by the FDIC so that in the 
event of insolvancy, a substantial amount of their funds would be 
recoverable. And the legislative history suggests that a CD is not 
a security; Thompson thought that capital shares were the only 
securities banks would be issuing. 
In~ited Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837 
(1975) (Powell, J.), the Court held that shares in a cooperative 
apartment were not securities. The Court noted that the purchasers 
of apartments were required to buy 18 shares of stock for each room 
at a cost of $25. A tennant terminating occupancy was required to 
offer his stock to the cooperative for $25. The Court explained 
that these shares 
"lack what the Court in Tcherepnin deemed the most common 
feature of stock: the right to receive 'dividends 
contingent upon an apportionment of profits.' 389 u.s., 
at 339. Nor do they possess the other characteristics 
traditionally associated with stock: they are not 
negotiable; they cannot be pledged or hypothicated' they 
confer no voting rights in proportion to to the number of 
shares owned; and they cannot appreciate in value. In 
short, the inducement to purchase was solely to acquire 
subs~zed low-cost living space; it was not to invest in 
profit." Id., at 851. 
The Court stressed that the key attribute of a security is the 
presence of an investment in a common venture motivated by a 
~~-------------~-----------~--------~ reasonable expectation of profits to be derived solely from the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. Id., at 851. 4 
,, 
4The ~lassie formulation of the test for a security was given 
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). There, the 
Court explained that the basic test is "whether the scheme involves 
an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others." See also Teamsters v. Daniels, 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Under this test, the CD would not appear to be a security. 
It represents an amount deposited with the bank, returning a set 
amount of interest, with minimal risk, rather than an investment in 
a common enterprise subject to the risks of gain and loss of the 
enterprise. 
3. Relevant decisions of the CAs. At least two CAs 5 have 
considered this question--whether bank CDs issued by federally 
insured banks are securities--in addition to the CA below: the CA4, 
& CA7. 
(a). The CA4. In Burrus, Cootes and Burrus v. MacKethan, 
537 F. 2d 1262, withdrawn as moot, 545 F. 2d 13SS (CA4 1976), cert 
denied, 434 u.s. S26 (1977), the CA4 held that "certificates of 
investment" issued by a savings and loan are not securities within 
the meaning of the acts. Under state law, savings and loans were 
allowed to issue such certificates, and the certificates were (under 
439 U.S. 551 (197S) (Powell, J.) (holding that employees' interests 
in a pension plan are not securities). 
5see also SEC v. Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Inc., 2S9 F. Supp. 
3, 31-33 (SDNY 1968), aff'd, 435 F. 2d 510 (CA2 1970) (CD not a 
security for purposes of the Investment Company Act); Bellah v. 
First National Bank of Herefore, 495 F. 2d 1109 (CAS 1974). In 
Bellah, the pltfs argued that CDs issued by a bank was a security. 
The court noted that a certificate of deposit (issued in exchange 
for currency) is not a "certificate of deposit, for a security." On 
the basis of the arguments presented to it, the CA concluded that a 
CD is not a securtiy, though it remanded for further development of 
this point, as the DC had not addressed it. 
The CAS has held that CDs of non-federally regulated (non-
insured) state banking institutions are securities. SEC v. First 
American Bank and Trust Co., 4Sl F. 2d 673, 677 (CAS 1973). 
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state law) regarded as equivalent to CDs issued by banks. The 
relation created by the certificate was debtor-creditor: the bank 
was liable to pay back the money at a certain time and at a certain 
interest rate. 
The CA4 regarded this certificate as "not distinguishable 
in any significant way from a pass-book issued by a savings bank, 
and it is hardly arguable that savings bank account books are 
securities rather than the equivalent of currency." Ibid. The 
court also relied on (1) the fact that the definition of "security" 
includes "certificates of deposit, for a security," but not 
certificates of deposit and (2) the fact that if certificates of 
deposit were securities, "there would be superimposed upon an 
already existing pattern of federal or state banking or like 
regulations •.. a further, and perhaps not wholly suitable, pattern 
of regulations by the SEC." Id., at 1265. 
(b). CA7. In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce Trust Co. 
v. Fingland, 615 F. 2d 465 (CA7 1980), the pltfs argued that trust 
funds were invested by Bahamian banking and trust entity, as 
trustee, in its own CD, whose terms and conditions were not 
described by pltfs. The Court held that the pltfs had failed to 
show the existence of a security, relying, like the CA4, on the 
inclusion of the words "certificate of deposit, for a security," and 
the absence of "security of deposit." The court also applied the 
"investment-in-an-enterprise" test developed by the Court and 
discussed above. The CA also noted that under the 1933 Glass-
Steagall Act, 6 as discussed above, it is unlawful for any person or 
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages. 
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organization to engage in issuing securities and at the same time 
engage in banking operations, such as issuing certificates of 
deposit. 
(c). The CA3 below. The CA3 (Gibbons & Sloviter) reasoned 
that, although Tcherepnin (holding withdrawable capital shares in an 
S & L a security) was not controlling, "functionally, from the 
depositor's standpoint, it is hard to distinguish long term deposit 
transactions with mutual institutions from similar deposit 
transactions with banks operated for the profit of stockholders." 
The court also relied heavily on the fact that when Tcherepnin was 
written, the SEC, FDIC, et al., unanimously agreed that deposit and 
share accounts of banks were securities for purposes of the fraud 
provisons of the securities acts, a position maintained before the 
CA3 below by the SEC (though now abandoned) • The CA3 thought the 
Tcherepnin Court must have been aware of the agencies' position and 
somehow (silently) depended on it in reaching its decision. The CA3 
held that a CD is the functional equivalent of a corporation's bond 
or note and therefore a security. 
4. Relevant decisions of the CAs on the status of notes. 
In concluding that a CD was a security because it was equivalent to 
corporate bonds and notes, the CA3 ignored the fact that the lower 
courts7 have not treated all notes as securities. Instead, the 
6Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 89, §21, 48 Stat. 189, current 
version at 12 u.s.c. §378(a) (1). 
Footnote(s) 7 will appear on following pages. 
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lower courts have tried to distinguish between those notes that are 
truely investments in the borrower--the prototypical example being 
bonds and notes traded in the securities market, with the interest 
rate varying with the investment risk--and a pure "loan," usually 
referred to as a "commercial note." 8 The lower courts have adapted 
the factors developed by this Court in cases such as Forman, and 
have attempted to determine whether the lender should be considered 
an investor in a joint enterprise, subject to the risks of success 
and failure, or a purely commercial lender, lending for interest 
with minimal risk and relatively indifferent to the success of the 
7The Court has never considered a case dealing with whether a 
debt instrument is a security. , __ 
8The "commercial-investment" distinction has developed in the 
CAS and the CA7. See Sonnenschien, Antifraud Provisions of Note 
Transactions, 35 Business Lawyer 1567, 1589-1596 (1980). The CA9 
has adopted a variation, under which the focus is whether the lender 
has generated risk capital. These approaches have been criticized 
as un r ab id., at 1589-1605. 
udge Prien y as joined in this criticism, and would start 
the presump 'on that a note is a security (because "note" is 
ed in t language of the definition), but would allow the 
issuer o s ow that this note is not a security. His examples of 
notes that are not securities are: 
"the note delivered in consumer financing, the note 
secured by a mortgage on a home, the short-term note 
secured by a lien on a small business or some of its 
assets, the note evidencing a "character" loan to a bank 
customer, short-term notes secured by an assignment of 
accounts receivable, or a note which simply formalizes an 
open-account dept incurred in the ordinary course of 
business " Exchange National Bank v. Touche Ross & 
Co., 544 F. 2d 1126, 1138 (CA2 1976). 
The American Law Institute would codify the "mercantile-
investment dichotomy that is emerging as the least imperfect 
solution to a troublesome problem." American Law Institute, Federal 
Securities Code--Proposed official Draft, at 159 (1978). 
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enterprise. A fully collateralized loari is usually not an 
investment. 
Even if the CD had "note" instead of CD stamped on it, 9 it 
would not be a security. It does not represent an investment in 
Marine Bank, but rather a deposit of unneeded money with the bank to 
be re-paid at a set interest rate with little risk. 
/ 4. The SG's position. The SG has taken the position that 
.. ~ the CD issued to the weavers is not a CD--but he's not so sure about 
~ others. The SG suspects that a CD issued by a non-federally 
~z~ regulated institution might be a security. He also feels that the 
/ 
~ ,,. 
f ./ vYading of CDs "in the secondary market" might present a different 
~&tJ ~ situation. And he maintains that a co should be considered a 
~il~ security for purposes of the 1940 Investment co. Act, though the 
__ ~ ~ definition of security in that act is identical to that in the SEA 
(1934). 
The SG's position between 
the various regulators--it certainly is not the result of logic or 
rational analysis. The SEC apparently wants to maximize its 
jurisdiction, but is willing to concede that where the FDIC and the 
9The SG maintains that CDs "could be found to fall within th[e 
literal] definitional language, •••• " SG brief at 10. The SG 
begins this argument by noting that the 1934 act's definition (the 
relevant one) includes the terms "note" and "debenture." And the 
Court has construed the 1934 definition as "virtually identical" to 
the 1933 definintion. And the 1933 definition includes "any 
evidence of indebtedness:" Thus, concludes the SG, a CD could be 
considered within the literal language of the definition, not just 
the catch-all. 
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other federal banking regulatory agenci~s · have jurisdiction, it will 
leave matters in their hands. It "follows" that the only CD that is 
definitely not a security is a CD issued by a federally insured bank 
that has not been traded in a secondary market. 
The proposition that bank CDs are securities for purposes 
of the Investment Co. Act of 1940 (though not under the securities 
acts of 1933 and 1934}, should be rejected. The basis for this 
argument is that the Investment Co. Act applies only to companies 
with more than 40% of their assets in securities. Investment Co. 
Act §3(a} (3}, 15 u.s.c. 80a-3(a} (3}. If CDs are not securities, 
money market funds (which hold approximately 22.9% of their assets 
in CDs} will be able to evade the Investment Co. Act by holding 40% 
of their assets in non-securities. This would be bad, explains the 
SG, because the relationship between a money market fund and its 
shareholders is identical to the relationship between an investment 
company and its shareholders. 
The major problem with this argument is that Congress 
provided that the Investment Co. Act applies to an entity engaged in 
investing or reinvesting only if it "owns or proposes to acquire 
securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of 
such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and 
cash items} on an unconsolidated basis." For other companies, the 
registration and disclosure provisions of the SEA apply. SEA 
§12(g} (2} (b), §78_!_(g} (2} (b). Given this definition of the scope of 
the Investment Co. Act, one suspects that Congress would not have 
wanted it to apply to money-market funds just because the 
relationship between their shareholders and the company is the same 
as the relationship between the sharehoiders of other investment 
companies and their shareholders. 
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The distinction Congress regarded as determinative is the 
amount of a company's holdings in cash or cash-like holdings 
relative to its holdings in securities, with their higher risk. 
Congress did not include gov't securities and cash items (low risk 
items) as securities in determining whether 40% of a company's 
assets were securities. And CDs and other deposit instruments are 
usually regarded as essentially cash items, and, in terms of risk, 
are certainly more like cash than like securities. In effect, the 
SG is arguing for the removal of the 40% limit on the Investment Co. 
Act's applicability, substituting for it a new standard: the Act 
applies to any company whose relation with its shareholders is like 
that of an investment company. 
In addition, it is most unlikely that Congress used the 
same definition of "security" in 1934 in the SEA and in 1940 in the 
Investment Co. Act, but meant different things. 
The SG's qualification that CDs issued by non-federally 
regulated (as opposed to those of federally regulated) entities 
might be CDs is similarly unprincipled. There is certainly nothing 
in the legislative history or language of the statute to suggest 
that whether the issuer is a federally regulated entity is relevant 
to whether an item is a security. If Congress did not intend, as a 
general matter, to regulate all banks under the securities acts--and 
if it deliberately did not extend federal banking regulation to all 
banks--Congress presumably thought that the states themselves could 
manage to regulate their own banks. Congress' failure to regulate 
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certain entities under one statute should · not, in itself, create a 
presumption that it meant to regulate them under another statute 
generally applicable to quite different entities and not applicable 
to similar entities subject to direct federal regulation. 
Turning to the secondary market distinction, see n. 40 in 
SG's brief, the idea here seems to be that an interest that is not a 
security at the time of issue might become one in a subsequent 
transaction. In effect, the SG is trying to change the 
jurisdictional coverage of the securities acts from one determined 
by reference to the type of instrument to one determined by the 
identity of the seller on a transaction-by-transaction basis (not a 
security unless this seller is already subject to pervaisive federal 
regulation). This is a fairly radical rewriting of the securities 
acts, which, by their terms, apply to purchases and sales (and 
registration, etc.) of securities. Thus, the pledge of the CD to 
Marine Bank was not the pledge of a security; the CD was not a 
security when it was pledged because it was not a security when 
issued and nothing happened between issuance and pledge to change 
its nature. 
here is whether the W-P agreement is an 
investment agreement. As discussed in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 
U.S. 293, 301 (1946), and other cases of this Court discussed above, 
the key question is whether there is an investment of money in a 
-------~~ ---- ---
common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of 
others. Here, in return for guaranteeing the loan, the Weavers -------. 
received the following: (1) use of the barn and pasture on the 
slaughterhouse premises: (2) 50% of the "adjusted net profits" of 
Columbus Packing so long as the Weavers remained co-obligors: (3) 
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$100 a month until loan repaid: and (4) veto of any future loans to 
Columbus. The Weavers maintain that the Bank induced them to sign 
- ==-
the pledge by telling them that the value of the Bank's collateral 
was sufficient to cover its interest and theirs and that there was 
little risk in the arrangement. See Brief of Weavers (red) n.lO at 
7. On the other hand, Mr. Weaver testified that they intended to 
"invest" in Columbus and to receive "a little share in the business, 
if he made any profits: he was giving us a little share in his 
business if we'd loan him a little working capital." Id., at 17 
n.l8. 
Two questions are presented by this issue. First, is the 
~ Giagreement an investment (and therefore a security)? Second, is it 
possible the Bank can be held liable for fraud in connection with 
the agreement, to which it was not a party and of which it knew 
nothing? 
1. Is the agreement a security? There are several ways in 
which this aspect of the case could be disposed of. One would be to 
remand for further factual development on whether this was an 
investment. On the other hand, Judge Weis, dissenting below, noted 
that the Howey test, affirmed by this Court in Forman, requires "an 
investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others." Forman, ~21 u.s., at 852 
(emphasis added).~noted that the Weaver's profits were 
not to come "solely~jn the efforts of others since the "profits" 
'' . 
c /,L,:,_. ~ .... ... r..f' ....,._.~ '-'.t«-4-<., . 
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included the right to use the Piccirilld's pasture and barn. In 
addition, Judge Weis understood "common enterprise" as meaning 
something more than a face to face encounter between two 
individuals. When all the parties involved deal directly with each 
other, the transaction is simply not the type of market transaction 
the securities laws were designed to regulate. Judge Weis approved 
the CA7's requirement that a common enterprise must include both 
multiple investors and a pooling of their funds. See Hird v. Agri-
~ 
Reasearch Council, Inc., 561 F. 2d 96, 100 (CA7 1977) . 10 The issue 
of whether a unique agreement between two individuals can be a 
seems to be just emerging, and there is little law on the 
point. --------~ I find both of Judge Weis' points persuasive. The ability 
~---------------~~ -- --to use the land and barn suggests a transaction more like a lease 
than a true investment--the value of that ability would not depend 
on the efforts of others or the degree of success of the enterprise. 
To the extent the guarantee was in exchange for use of the land and 
barn, it was not an investment at all. In Howey and the other cases 
articulating the Howey rule with its "solely" requirement, the Court 
has indicated that a transaction must be solely an investment before 
10The CA7 position that a contract between with a "unitary 
nature" is not a security seems to have originated in Milnarid v. M-
P Commodities, Inc., 457 F. 2d 274, 277 (CA7 1972) (Duffy, Kerner, & 
v John Paul Stevens, Circuit Judges). 
The American Law Institute's proposed code includes a provision 
that investment contracts are securities only if an offering or 
distribution has been made pursuant to an offering statement or 
distribution statement. American Law Institute, Federal Securities 
Code--Proposed Official Draft, at 158 (1978). 
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it will be considered a security. 
On the second point, if an agreement between two -
individuals can be a security, rule lOb-5 may soon apply to all 
contracts in which one side can argue that it expects to --contracted-for benefit from the profits of the other party's 
enterprise. Individually-negotiated, unique, contracts are 
certainly not the types of arrangements Congress had in mind when it 
attemped to protect investors by regulating the securities markets. 
2. Can the Bank be held liable for fraud in connection 
with this second security? The Weavers themselves testified (in 
affidavits) that they did not tell the Bank about the W-P agreement. 
And various Bank officers testified (in affidavits) that they knew 
nothing about the agreement. The agreement was prepared by 
Piccirillo's attorney and delivered by the Piccirillos to the Weaver 
home, where the four of them negotiated certain changes and signed 
it. It is likely that the Bank did not know about the agreement. 
The DC concluded that the Bank could not, therefore, be 
held liable on a secondary-liability theory for aidding and abetting 
(aidding and abetting fraud in connection with the sale fo this 
security) because it did not know of the "security." And the DC 
rejected the notion that the Bank could not be held liable for 
failure to disclose the debtor's status, noting that there was no 
such duty under state law. 
But the weavers did not just accuse the Bank of failure to 
disclose. They accused it of affirmative acts constituting fraud: 
. '· 
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There is, therefore, no need for an aidding and abetting theory. 
Moreover, even if the Bank did not know about the agreement, it must 
have known that the Weavers were getting something out of the deal. 
Given the opportunity to present their case in a trial (i.e., 
assuming the W-P agreement is a security), the Weavers might be able 
to show that the Bank knew, or should have known, that as a result 
of the Bank's fruadulent statements to the Weavers, the Weavers were 
purchasing some kind of security from the Picirillos. If such a 
showing were made, I do not see why the Bank should not be liable. 
\
~ you consider the W-P agreement a security, it would be 
appropriate to remand for trial on whether the Bank can be held 
liable for the weavers' loss. 
C. The Pendant Claims 
This case (viewing the facts most favorably to the weavers) 
vV 
~is really very sad. The Weavers argue that if federal courts do not 
consider their claims, they may be out of court. They explain that 
they filed an action in state court "by way of summons which was not 
served in reliance upon the federal court resolving the controversy. 
Any further prosecution of this claim in state court now may well be 
barred by a two year statute of limitations." Resp brief (red), at 
-----7 
42 n.30. I don't understand this at all. Why file something in 
state court in such a way that it does you no good? Moreover, at 
the time the DC dissmissed this action (Jan. 11, 1980), the 2-year 
statute had not run--the contract was signed Mar. 17, 1978. The 
Weavers' lawyers had over 2 months in which to file something 
~effective in state court after it was clear that they might not get 
24. 
anywhere in federal court (which they should have suspected from the 
beginning). 
The CA remanded the pendant claims to the DC to consider 
whether they should be tried with the federal ones. This aspect of 
theCA's decision was not challenged in the cert petn, but if the 
Court holds that neither the CD nor the W-P agreement is a security, 
there is no point in remanding for the DC's consideration of only 
the pendant claims. In United Mine workers v. Gibbs, 383 u.s. 715 
(1966), the Court held that it was proper to consider state-law 
claims based on the same facts as a federal claim, but added that if 
the federal claim were is dismissed before trial, "certainly .•. the 
state claims should be dismissed as well." If the remand consists 
only of the pendant claims, the DC will simply dismiss them 
automatically. 
If either the CD or the W-P agreement is a security, there 
will be a remand for trial. In that event, the state-law claims 
should also be remanded for the DC to consider whehter they should 
be tried together with the federal claims, a question the DC did not 
address because it dismissed all the federal claims prior to trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The major question is whether a ban~ CD is a security 
within the meaning of that term in the SEA. The language of the 
statute, its legislative, and the decisions of this Court suggest 
that it is not. A security is an investment whereby an investor 
places his capital at the risk of an enterprise in the hope of 
profiting thereby solely from the skills and efforts of others. A 
·'\ 
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CD is simply a deposit of money in a ban'k · for safekeeping, at a set 
interest rate, with minimal risk. Such deposits are subject to 
regulation under the Glass-Steagall Act, not the securities acts. 
The next question is whether the W-P agreement is a 
security. I would argue that it is not a security because it is a 
unique, individually-negotiated agreement (a contract) between two 
individuals: as such it fails to meet the developing requirements 
for finding an intent to invest in a "common en-terprise." Moreover, 
'-.., 
'-, 
it is not a security because the weavers received ihe right to use 
land and a barn, and did not, therefore, expect to profit solely 
from the efforts of others. 
A holding that neither the CD nor W-P agreement is a } 
security would be consistent with the ALI's proposed federal 
securities code.ll 
If you consider the W-P agreement a security, then it is 
necessary to consider whether it is possible that, at a trial, the 
Weavers could establish a basis for holding the Bank liable. 
Viewing the facts most favorably for the Weavors, a remand is 
11The American Law Institute has published a proposed official 
draft of a federal securitis code (Mar. 15, 1978). The definition 
of security is essentially the same as in the securities acts, but 
the proposal also includes a section excluding certain interests 
from the term. Most of the exclusions are the codification of 
caselaw. Securities do not include consumer or commercial loans or 
bank deposits or ens. And certificates of interest, investment 
contracts, and fractional undivided inter~ts in mineral rights are 
securities only if the "interest or instrument is of a class that 
was the subject of an offering statement or a distribution 
statement!' American Law Institute, Federal securities Code--
Proposed Official Draft, at 157-158 (1978). 
,. 
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appropriate because they might be able to · show that the Bank 
deliberately mis-led them knowing (or under circumstances such that 
it should have known) that as a result, the Weavers would purchase 
some form of security from the borrowers. 
If neither the agreement nor the CD is a security, there is 
no point (nor any harm) in remanding the pendant state claims to the 
trial court; it is settled law that if federal claims are dismissed 
prior to trial, pendent state claims should also be dismissed. If 
either the agreement or the CD is a security, however, it is 
appropriate to remand the pendent claims to the DC for its 
consideration of whether they should be tried with the federal 
claims. 
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appropriate for the DC to hear the pendent claims even if the 
federal claims are dismissed (contrary to the bench memo); and (2) a 
clarification of the SG's position (petr confused this point at oral 
argument. 
1. Pendent claims. In the bench memo, I stated that it 
is settled law that when federal claims are dismissed prior to 
trial, pendent claims should also be dismissed, citing United Mine 
Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.,S. 715 (1966). In Gibbs, the Court stated 
that when federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, pendent state 
claims "should be dismissed as well." But the Court was not 
considering a case in which pendent state could no longer be brought 
in state court. ----"7 
In Rosado v. Wyman,397 U.S. 397 (1970), a three-judge court 
was convened to hear a federal constitutional claim and a pendent 
federal statutory claim. 
--:z:::: 
Prior to a decision, but after some 
hearings and argument, the federal constitutional claim was mooted. 
The question therefore arose as to whether the three-judge court had 
jurisdiction over the pendent federal statutory claim. 
2. 
The resps (in Rosado) argued that Gibbs was controlling and 
that the pendent claim should have been dismissed because the claim 
conferring jurisdiction on the three-judge court had been dismissed 
before trial. The Court did not agree, distinguishing Gibbs on the 
ground that there, the Court was discussing an insubstantial 
jurisdiction-conferring claim whereas in Rosado, the Court was 
/ ' 
considering the mooting of a claim. The Court noted that "[u]nlike 
insubstantiality, which is apparent at the outset, mootness, 
frequently a matter beyond the control of the parties, may not occur 
until after substantial time and energy have been expended looking 
toward the resolution of a dispute that plaintiffs were entitled to 
bring in federal court." Id., at 404. The Court did not expressly 
overrule the Gibbs dicta, however: 
"Whether or not the view that an insubstantial federal 
question does not confer jurisdiction--a maxim more 
ancient than analytically sound--should now be held to 
mean that a district court should be considered without 
discretion, as opposed to power, to hear a pendent claim, 
we think the respondents' analogy [from Gibbs to this 
case] fails." 
Thus, the Court explicitly rejected the analogy to Gibbs, rather 
than overruling it, though it did express doubt that a DC would lack 
the power to hear pendent state claims. 
After Rosado, a strong argument can be made that a DC has 
jusrisdiction to consider state claims pendent to federal claims, -----
even federal claims dismissed prior to trial, and that this 
jurisdiction should be exercised in appropiate instances to serve 
the purposes of judicial efficiency and equity. 
On March 17, 1978, the Weavers pledged their CD to the Bank 
and the Bank loaned Columbus $65,000. On May 4, 1979, the complaint 
was filed with the DC. The action was dismissed for lack of any 
federal question on Jan. 11, 1980. At that time, the 1-year Pa. 
statute of limitations for the state security-act claim (mentioned 
for the first time at oral argument) barred the state security-act 
claim. There was still over two months in which to file the state 
---------------------------~'---------------~ common law-fraud claim. ----------At oral argument, resps argued that the dismissal was on 
the eve of trial and, given the possible statute of limitation 
problem, equity supports the exercise of jurisdiction by the DC. 
I find this case a close one. Provided there is a 
substantial federal claim at the time a complaint is filed, the 
better rule would seem to be a DC has jurisdiction to consider 
pendent claims even if the federal claim is dismissed prior to 
trial. Whether to exercise such jurisdiction would be a matter 
'-
3. 
~ committed to the discretion of the DC and would depend on the amount 
of judicial resources already expended and the equities of the 
situation (e.g., if the deft was on notice of the claims in the 
federal action and the state statute of limitiations has run at time 
federal claim is dismissed, the equities suggest that the DC retain 
jurisdiction unless the deft is willing to waive the statute of 
limitations in the state court proceeding). 
In this case, the federal claim was not obviously 77 
' 
insubstantial in the sense that it was clear that there really was 
no federal claim when the action was filed. Thus, for example, if 
the DC had gone ahead and tried the claims and then dismissed the 
federal claim, it is clear that there was a substantial-enough claim 
under Gibbs to support the exercise of jurisdiction over the state-
4. 
law claims. Whether to exercise jurisdiction given that the federal 
~ claim was dismissed prior to trial should turn, therefore, on the 
• judicial resources already expended and the equitites of the 
situtation. At the time the case was dismissed, there had already 
been discovery, the submission of pretrial narrative statements, and 
a pre-trial conference. It may be that much of this effort would 
have to be duplicated were the state law claims tried in state 
court. Moreover, at the time of dismissal, according to the oral 
argument, the state-security law claim was time-barred. On the 
otQer hand, the common law-fraud count was not time-barred, and 
resps nevertheless made no attempt to file an effective fraud claim 
in state court. 
-----------The DC will be in a better position to judge these factors 
than is this Court--especially the extent to which judicial 
rescources have been expended and will be conserved by proceeding 
with the state-law counts in federal court. The question is not 
even technically before the Court; as the case now stands, the 
state-law counts have been remanded to the DC for its determination 
of whether it should precede with them. Cert was not granted on the 
propriety of that remand. This is the proper solution, though the 
Court might mention in the decision that the DC was being given the 
opportunity to consider whether, under Rosado, it should consider 
the claims. 
2. The SG's position. The Bank's lawyer maintained that 
the SG had not conceded that all cos issued by federally-insured 
banks are securities, but he was unable to point to a particular 
5. 
part of the SG's brief to illustrate his point. The lawyer thought 
that the SG had reserved the question of how the regulators would 
treat CDs of federally-insured banks traded in a secondary market. 
He was right. This reservation is in the SG's brief, n.40 at 24: 
"Another situation that may present a different 
context is the trading of certificates of deposit in the 
secondary market, a circumstance that is not presented in 
this case." 
I have never been sure what the SG meant by this. The CD here was 
traded after issue. For purposes of the securities law, a pledge is 
a sale, and the Weavers did, therefore, trade the CD for the W-P 
agreement in a secondary (post-issue) transaction. Perhaps the SG 
only reserves the question in instances in which there is a more 
formal "market," but, if so, he gives no guidance as to what factors 
he considers relevant in distinguishing between this secondary sale 
and a transaction in a secondary market. ~ ~ 6? -z-c-~ 
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We granted certiorari to decide whether two instrum ... A j · 
a conventional certificate of dep.,osit and a business a1£_ee;;;nt~
between two fami1fes, coui(ibe consideroo securities tinder · • 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 
I 
Respondents, Sam and Alice Weaver, purchased a $50,000 
certificate of deposit from petitioner, Marine Bank, on Feb-
ruary 28, 1978. The certificate of deposit has a six year ma-
turity and it is insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. 1 The Weavers subsequently pledged the cer-
tificate of deposit to Marine Bank on March 17, 1978, to guar-
antee a $65,000 loan made by the Bank to Columbus Packing 
Company. Columbus was a wholesale slaughterhouse and 
1 The certificate of deposit pays 7'12% interest and provides that, if the 
Bank permits early withdrawal, the depositor will earn interest at the 
Bank's current savings passbook rate on the amount withdrawn, except 
that no interest will be paid for the three months prior to withdrawal. 
When the Weavers purchased the certificate of deposit, it could only be in-
sured up to $40,000 by the FDIC. The ceiling on insured deposits is now 
$100,000. Act of March 31, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 147, 
§ 308(b)(1). 
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retail meat market which owed the Bank $33,000 at that time 
for prior loans and was also substantially overdrawn on its 
checking account with the Bank. 
In consideration for guaranteeing the Bank's new loan, Co-
lumbus' owners, Raymond and Barbara Piccirillo•, entered 
into an agreement with the Weavers. Under the terms of 
the agreement, the Weavers were to receive 50% of Colum-
bus' net profits and $100 per month as long as they guaran-
teed the loan. It was also agreed that the Weavers could use 
Columbus' barn and pasture at the discretion of the 
Piccirillos, and that they had the right to veto future borrow-
ing by Columbus. 
The Weavers allege that Bank officers told them Columbus 
would use the $65,000 loan as working capital but instead it 
was immediately applied to pay Columbus' overdue obliga-
tions. The Bank kept approximately $42,800 to satisfy its 
prior loans and Columbus' overdrawn checking account. All 
but $3,800 of the remainder was disbursed to pay overdue 
taxes and to satisfy other creditors; the Bank then refused to 
permit Columbus to overdraw its checking account. Colum-
bus became bankrupt four months later. Although the Bank 
had not yet resorted to the Weavers' certificate of deposit at 
the time this litigation commenced, it acknowledged that its 
other security was inadequate and that it intended to claim 
the pledged certificate of deposit. 
These allegations were asserted in a complaint filed in Fed-
eral District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
in support of a claim that the Bank violated § 10(b) of theSe-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78j(b). The 
Weavers also pleaded pendent claims for violations of the 
Pennsylvania Securities Act and for common law fraud by the 
Bank. The Weavers alleged that Bank officers actively so-
licited them to guarantee the $65,000 loan to Columbus while 
knowing, but not disclosing, Columbus' financial plight or the 
Bank's plans to repay itself from the new loan guaranteed by 
the Weavers' pledged certificate of deposit. Had they 
known of Columbus' precarious financial condition and the 
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Bank's plans, the Weavers allege they would not have guar-
anteed the loan and pledged the certificate of deposit. The 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Bank. It concluded that if a wrong occurred it did not take 
place "in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity," as required for liability under § 10(b). The District 
Court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the state 
law claims. 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. Weaver v. 
Marine Bank, 637 F. 2d 157 (CA3 1980). A divided court 
held that a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that ei-
ther the certificate of deposit or the agreement between the 
Weavers and the Piccirillos was a security. 2 It therefore re-
manded for further consideration of the claim based on the 
federal securities laws. The Court of Appeals also reversed 
the District Court's dismissal of the pendent state law claims. 
We granted certiorari,-- U. S. -- (1981), and were-
verse. We hold that neither the certificate of deposit nor the 
agreement between the Weavers and the Piccirillos is a secu-
rity under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws. We remand the case to the Court of Appeals to deter-
mine whether the pendent state claims should be dismissed. 
II 
The definition of security in the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 3 is quite broad. The Act was adopted to restore inves-
2 The Court of Appeals also concluded that the pledge of a security is a 
sale, an issue on which the federal circuits were split. We held in Rubin v. 
United States,- U. S.- (1981), that a pledge of stock is equivalent 
to a sale for the purposes of the antifraud provisions of the federal securi-
ties laws. Accordingly, in determining whether fraud may have occurred 
here "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security," the only 
issue now before the Court is whether a security was involved. 
3 Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78c(a)(10), provides: 
"(a) When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires-
(10) The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, de-
benture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agree-
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tors' confidence in the financial markets, 4 and the term secu-
rity was meant to include "the many types of instruments 
that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept 
of a security." H.R/Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 11 
(1933); quoted in V nited Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 849-850 (1975). The statutory defi-
nition excludes only currency and notes with a maturity of 
less than nine months. It includes ordinary stocks and 
bonds, along with the "countless and variable schemes de-
vised by those who seek the use of the money of others on the 
promise of profits .... " SEC v. W.J. Howey, Inc., 328 
U. S. 293, 299 (1946). Thus, the coverage of the antifraud 
provisions of the securities laws is not limited to instruments 
traded at securities exchanges and over-the-counter mar-
kets, but extends to uncommon and irregular instruments. 
Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co. 
404 U. S. 6, 10 (1971); SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). We have repeatedly held that the 
test "is what character the instrument is given in commerce 
by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the 
ment or in any oil, gas , or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-
trust certificate, pre-organization certificate or subscription, transferable 
share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, 
for a security, or in general, any instrument commonly known as a 'secu-
rity'; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim 
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, 
any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft, bill 
of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of 
issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any 
renewal thereof the maturity is likewise limited." 
We have consistently held that the definition of security in the 1934 Act is 
essentially the same as the definition of security in § 2(1) of the Securities 
Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. § 77(b)(1). United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975). 
• Fitzgibbon, What is a Security? A Redefinition Based on Eligibility 
to Participate in the Financial Markets , 64 Minn. L. Rev. 893, 912-918 
(1980). 
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economic inducements held out to the prospect." SEC v. 
United Benefit Life Insurance Co., 387 U. S. 202, 211 (1967), 
quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., supra, 320 
U. S., at 352-353. 
The broad statutory definition is preceded, however, by 
the statement that the terms mentioned are not to be consid-
ered securities if "the context otherwise requires . . .. " 
Moreover, we are satisfied that Congress, in enacting these-
curities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal rem-
edy for fraud. Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 
F. 2d 1252, 1253 (CA9 1976); Bellah v. First National Bank, 
495 F. 2d 1109, 1114 (CA5 1974). 
III 
The Court of Appeals concluded that the certificate of de-
posit purchased by the Weavers might be a security. Exam-
ining the statutory definition, supra, n. 3, the court correctly 
noted that the certificate of deposit is not expressly excluded 
from the definition since it is not currency and it has a matu-
rity exceeding nine months. 5 It concluded, however, that 
the certificate of deposit was the functional equivalent of the 
withdrawable capital shares of a savings and loan association 
held to be securities in Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 
(1967). The court also reasoned that, from an investor's 
standpoint, a certificate of deposit is no different from any 
other long-term debt obligation. 6 Unless distinguishing fea-
"The definition of a security in the 1934 Act, supra, n. 4, includes the 
term, "certificate of deposit, for a security." However, this term does not 
refer to certificates of deposit such as the Weavers purchased. Instead, 
"certificate of deposit, for a security" refers to instruments issued by pro-
tective committees in the course of corporate reorganizations. Canadian 
Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Fingland, 615 F. 2d 465, 468 (CA7 1980). 
6 In addition, the Court of Appeals noted that the Securities and Ex-
change Commission had taken the position that certificates of deposit are 
securities. However, the SEC has filed a brief as amicus curiae in this 
case, jointly with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Board of 
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tures were found on remand, the court concluded that the 
certificate of deposit should be held to be a security. 
Tcherepnin is not controlling. The withdrawable capital 
shares found there to be securities did not pay a fixed rate of 
interest; instead, purchasers received dividends based on the 
association's profits. Purchasers also received voting rights. 
In short, the withdrawable capital shares in Tcherepnin were 
much more like ordinary shares of stock and "the ordinary 
concept of a security," ante, at 4, than a certificate of deposit. 
The Court of Appeals' also concluded that a certificate of 
deposit is similar to any other long-term debt obligation com-
monly found to be a security. In our view, however, there is 
an important difference between a bank certificate of deposit 
and other long-term debt obligations. This certificate of de-
posit was issued by a federally regulated bank which is sub-
ject to the comprehensive set of regulations governing the 
banking industry. 7 Deposits in federally regulated banks 
are protected by the reserve, reporting, and inspection re-
quirements of the federal banking laws; advertising relating 
to the interest paid on deposits is also regulated. 8 In addi-
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, which argues that the Weavers' certificate of deposit is 
not a security. 
7 In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551 
(1979), we held that a noncontributory, compulsory pension plan was not a 
security. One of our reasons for our holding in Daniel was that the pen-
sion plan was regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA): "The existence of this comprehensive legislation govern-
ing the use and terms of employee plans severely undercuts all arguments 
for extending the Securities Acts to noncontributory, compulsory pension 
plans." 439 U. S., at 569-570. Since ERISA regulates the substantive 
terms of pension plans, and also requires certain disclosures, it was unnec-
essary to subject pension plans to the requirements of the federal securi-
ties laws as well. 
8 See, e. g. 12 U. S. C. § 461(b) (reserve requirements); 12 U. S. C. (and 
Supp. Ill) §§ 161, 324, and 1817 (reporting requirements); 12 U. S. C. (and 
Supp. III) §§ 481, 483, and 1820(b) (inspection requirements); 12 CFR 
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tion, deposits are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation. Since its formation in 1933, nearly all deposi-
tors in failing banks insured by the FDIC have received pay-
ment in full, even payment for the portions of their deposits 
above the amount insured. 1980 Annual Report of the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation 18-21 (1981). 
We see, therefore, important differences between a certifi-
cate of deposit purchased from a federally regulated bank and 
other long-term debt obligations. The Court of Appeals 
failed to give appropriate weight to the important fact that 
the purchaser of a certificate of deposit is virtually guaran-
teed payment in full, whereas the holder of an ordinary long-
term debt obligation assumes the risk of the borrower's insol-
vency. The definition of security in the 1934 Act provides 
that an instrument which seems to fall within the broad 
sweep of the Act is not to be considered a security if the con-
text otherwise requires. It is unnecessary to subject issuers 
of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws since the holders of 
bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under 
the federal banking laws. We therefore hold that the certifi-
cate of deposit purchased by the Weavers is not a security. 9 
IV 
The Court of Appeals also held that a finder of fact could 
conclude that the separate agreement between the Weavers 
and the Piccirillos is a security. Examining the statutory 
language, supra, n. 3, the court found that the agreement 
might be a "certificate of interest or participation in any 
profit-sharing agreement" or an "investment contract." It 
stressed that the agreement gave the Weavers a share in the 
§§ 217.6 and 329.8 (advertising). 
9 We reject respondents' argument that the certificate of deposit was 
somehow transformed into a security when it was pledged, even though it 
was not a security when purchased. 
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profits of the slaughterhouse which would result from the ef-
forts of the Piccirillos. Accordingly, in that court's view, the 
agreement fell within the definition of investment contract 
stated in Howey, because "the scheme involves an invest-
ment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others." 328 U. 8., at 301. 
Congress intended the securities laws to cover those in-
struments ordinarily and commonly considered to be securi-
ties in the commercial world, but the agreement between the 
Weavers and the Piccirillos is not the type of instrument that 
comes to mind when the term security is used and does not 
fall within "the ordinary concept of a security." Ante, at 4. 
The unusual instruments found to constitute securities in 
prior cases involved offers to a number of potential investors, 
not a private transaction as in this case. In Howey, for ex-
ample, 42 persons purchased interests in a citrus grove dur-
ing a four-month period. 328 U. 8., at 295. In C.M. Joiner 
Leasing, offers to sell oil leases were sent to over 1,000 pros-
pects. 320 U. 8., at 346. In C.M. Joiner Leasing, we 
noted that a security is an instrument in which there is "com-
mon trading." !d., at 351. The instruments involved in 
C .M. Joiner Leasing and Howey had equivalent values to 
most persons and could have been traded publicly. ) 
Here, in contrast, the Piccirillos distributed no prospectus . 
to the Weavers or to other potential investors, and the 
unique agreement they negotiated was not desig'!!ed ,tv be 
trad~d publicly. The provision that the Weavers could use 
tlie barn and pastures of the slaughterhouse at the discretion 
of the Piccirillos underscores the unique character of the 
transaction. Similarly, the provision that the Weavers could 
veto future loans gave them a measure of control over the op-
eration of the slaughterhouse not characteristic of a security. 
Although the agreement gave the Weavers a share of the 
Piccirillos' profits, if any, that provision alone is not sufficient 
to make that agreement a security. Accordingly, we hold 
.. 
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that this unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by the 
parties, is not a security. 10 
v 
The Weavers allege that the Bank manipulated them so 
that they would suffer the loss the Bank would have borne 
from the failure of the Columbus Packing Company. What-
ever claims they may have against the Bank are not before 
the Court since the Court of Appeals did not treat the issue of 
the pendent state law claims. Accordingly, the case is re-
manded for consideration of whether the District Court 
should now entertain those claims. 
Reversed and remanded. 
10 Cf. Kotz, supra, 532 F. 2d, at 1260-1062 (Kennedy, J. , concurring) (un-
secured note, the terms of which were negotiated face-to-face, given to a 
bank in return for a business loan, is not a security) . 
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